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Abstract 
 
We seem to hold corporations to an impossible standard. We call for profit maximization, 
but at the same time want to place strict limits on the methods corporations may use to 
obtain them. In this thesis, I explore two popular theories of the corporation: stakeholder 
theory and shareholder theory. I examine the degree to which each theory explains the 
corporation as it exists today, as defined in the law and through its behavior, but also the 
theories‘ normative appeal. I conclude by positing what I find to be the best normative 
account of the corporation: a theory of how we should structure the corporation in the 
United States so it is the most morally-defensible. 
 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
Adam Smith warned in 1776 that ―joint-stock companies…can…scarce ever fail 
to do more harm than good.‖1 His warning went unheeded. 
Joint-stock companies, more commonly known today as corporations, dominate 
international business. While proprietorships and partnerships together outnumber 
corporations almost five to one, corporations have earned more than twice the combined 
profits of proprietorships and partnerships since 2000.
2
 In 2009, Walmart alone employed 
more than two million people.
3
 That American GDP increased 43-fold since 1890 is in 
large part due to the rise of the corporate structure.
4
 
As powerful as corporations might be, however, they do not enjoy the simple 
ownership structures of their smaller counterparts. Proprietorships occur when an 
individual person opens (but does not incorporate) a business by himself or herself. 
Partnerships occur when multiple people open (but do not incorporate) a business by 
themselves and agree to share in the profits.
5
 But corporations?  
The United States government defines a for-profit corporation as ―an independent 
legal entity owned by shareholders.‖6 Corporations have potentially endless life spans 
and usually shield their owners from liability. When I sue a corporation, I can hope to 
                                                        
1
 Smith, Adam. The Wealth of Nations. London: Penguin Books, 1999. 
2
 United States. United States Census Bureau. Washington D.C. Number of Tax Returns, Receipts, and Net 
Income by Type of Business. January 01, 2012. Accessed April 15, 2013. 
http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0744.pdf. 
3
 "Global 500 2010: Biggest Companies: Employees." CNNMoney. January 01, 2010. Accessed April 28, 
2013. http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/global500/2010/performers/companies/biggest. 
4
 Blanchard, Oliver. "U.S. GDP Since 1890." Lecture, Macroeconomics, 3E, Upper Saddle River, April 03, 
2013. http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctpnpa/growth.pdf. 
5
 United States. Internal Revenue Service. Washington D.C. Small Business and Self-Employed Tax 
Center. Accessed April 01, 2013. 
http://brc.dc.gov/tax/irssummary.asp. 
6
 United States. U.S. Small Business Administration. Washington D.C. Choosing Your Business Structure. 
Accessed April 01, 2013. http://www.sba.gov/content/corporation. 
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recover what is owned by the corporation itself, but not the personal wealth or belongings 
of individual shareholders or managers. The limited liability aspect is no coincidence; the 
legal protections encourage new enterprise because neither entrepreneurs nor investors 
would necessarily lose their life savings over one failed endeavor. Nicholas Butler 
Murray, former President of Columbia University, told the New York Chamber of 
Commerce in 1911 that ―the limited liability corporation is the greatest single discovery 
of modern times [because] it makes possible huge economy in production and trading.‖7  
Under federal and state law, the corporation thus becomes a sort of ―legal 
person.‖8 The corporation may be taxed, the corporation may sue and be sued, the 
corporation enjoys freedom of speech protection – and yet the corporation clearly is not a 
person. Corporations still do not walk, talk, emote, or vote. Society cannot even punish 
the corporate entity in the abstract, that is, in a way that does not simultaneously punish 
its shareholders, employees, or other stakeholders. These complications of the corporate 
structure invite inquiry regarding what a corporation is and also what a corporation 
should be. To better articulate this account of a ‗legal person‘ is the project of corporate 
theory.  
Corporate theories can feature positive and normative components. Theories 
might be positive, defining what the corporation is and explaining what corporations do. 
Normative theories, meanwhile, assert why corporations should be structured a certain 
                                                        
7
 Price, Sam. "Limited Liability: An Economic and Moral Consideration." The Student Journal of Law. 
Accessed April 01, 2013. http://www.sjol.co.uk/issue-4/limited-liability-an-economic-and-moral-
consideration. 
8
 Smith, G., and D. Dyer. "The Rise and Transformation of the American Corporation." In The American 
Corporation Today, by Carl Kaysen. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. 
3 
 
way and how corporations should behave.
9
 My goal in this paper is to analyze two 
popular theories of the corporation through these lenses of positivity and normativity, in 
the process developing what I believe to be the most compelling account of the modern-
day corporation in the United States.  
                                                        
9
 Donaldson, Thomas. "The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and 
Implications." The Academy of Management Review 20, no. 1 (1995): 65-91. Accessed April 01, 2013. 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/258887. 
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2. The Fiduciary Theories 
A fiduciary duty is a responsibility to act as an agent of another party‘s interest.10 
Corporate theory derived from notions of fiduciary duty holds that managers must act on 
behalf of some other group, as a result of either legal or moral obligations. Two branches 
of fiduciary theory enjoy widespread support: shareholder theory and stakeholder theory. 
Shareholder theorists argue that managers must act in accordance with the interests of a 
corporation‘s shareholders, but stakeholder theorists believe managers must act in 
accordance with the interests of everyone legitimately and substantially affected by the 
operations of the firm (including employees, customers, and the local community, in 
addition to the shareholders).
11
 Commonly known as ―Friedman vs. Freeman‖ due to the 
proponents of each theory, the shareholder-stakeholder debate boils down to the degree to 
which managers should consider non-shareholder interests.
12
 Below I explain the 
arguments in support of each theory. 
2.1 Shareholder Theory 
 Shareholder theorists want to limit the range of stakeholders that factor into 
corporate decision-making. They argue that the American legal system, which protects 
free enterprise and private property, turns business managers into ―the employees of the 
owners of the business.‖13 Since investors are the owners of corporations, managers 
become the agents of these shareholders. As agents, managers are responsible for 
                                                        
10
 "Fiduciary Duty." Legal Information Institute, Cornell University Law School. Accessed April 01, 2013. 
http://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fiduciary_duty. 
11
 Smith, Jeff H. "MIT Sloan Management Review." MIT Sloan Management Review RSS. July 15, 2013. 
Accessed April 01, 2013. http://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/the-shareholders-vs-stakeholders-debate/. 
12
 Ronnegrad, David, and Craig N. Smith. "Shareholder vs. Stakeholders: How Liberal and Libertarian 
Political Philosophy Frames the Basic Debate on Business Ethics." INSEAD Faculty & Research Working 
Papers, 2011. Accessed April 1, 2013. http://www.insead.edu/facultyresearch/research/doc.cfm?did=48947. 
13
 Friedman, Milton. "The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits." The New York 
Times Magazine (New York), September 13, 1970. 
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furthering shareholder interests, which Milton Friedman assumes generally to be profit 
maximization.
14
 
 Friedman, though, adds an important caveat to his description of acceptable 
corporate behavior. If managers represent shareholder interests, and shareholders seek 
only profit maximization, shareholder theory would seem to compel managers to 
singularly pursue profit. To most, this loses normative appeal. We do not want 
corporations polluting rivers and starving employees in order to boost investment returns.  
As a result, shareholder theorists specify that managers are constrained by ―the basic 
rules of society…embodied in law and…ethical custom.‖15 They preempt objections that 
shareholder theory encourages law-breaking or immoral behavior by explicitly stating in 
the theory that managers cannot break the law or engage in customarily-immoral 
behavior. For Friedman and the shareholder theorists, this qualified shareholder account 
provides the most persuasive theory of the corporation.
16
  
2.1.1 As Positive Theory 
 Central to shareholder theory is the principal-agent relationship between the 
shareholders and the management. Managers assume a fiduciary duty to further the 
shareholder interest of earning returns on their investment, while simultaneously 
respecting law and ethical custom. Friedman‘s caveat thus allows corporations to care for 
the interests of stakeholders – as long as the care can be explained by deference to law, 
ethical custom, or long run profit maximization. Consequently, the manager that respects 
stakeholder interest can still be said to practice shareholder management. Even Friedman 
                                                        
14
 Ibid 
15
 Ibid  
16
 Smith, Jeff H. "MIT Sloan Management Review." MIT Sloan Management Review RSS. July 15, 2013. 
Accessed April 01, 2013. http://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/the-shareholders-vs-stakeholders-debate/. 
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admits this makes it difficult to judge ―how well he [the shareholder manager] is 
performing his task.‖17  
 The assessment of a corporation‘s adherence to shareholder theory must therefore 
explore the degree of respect afforded to stakeholder interests. Given the spirit of 
Friedman‘s account, I argue that shareholder theory, properly understood, expects from 
managers very minimal commitments to stakeholders. I must make this assumption about 
the ethics in Friedman‘s account because he does not explain how his understanding of 
‗ethical custom‘ translates to stakeholder obligations (a problem I address later). 
However, the tone and context of Friedman‘s argument seem most consistent with the 
view that ethics provide a check against particularly egregious corporate actions rather 
than a strict standard that every corporate action must meet. For instance, Friedman 
makes a point to say that firms should not ―take seriously‖ their responsibilities to 
stakeholders like employees and the environment.
18
 In practice, I believe this means 
corporations can be said to accord with stakeholder theory when they prioritize short run 
profits over stakeholder interests, as long as they do not knowingly sacrifice long run 
profits, break laws, or violate very obvious ethical norms in the process. 
2.1.1.1 The Actions Corporations Take 
 Lynn Stout of Cornell University sees a heavy influence of shareholder theory on 
corporate actions today. She notes how, in the name of profits, ―public companies have 
sold key assets (Kodak's patents), outsourced jobs (Apple), cut back on customer service 
(Sears) and research and development (Motorola)…and lobbied Congress for corporate 
                                                        
17
 Friedman, Milton. "The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits." The New York 
Times Magazine (New York), September 13, 1970. 
18
 Ibid 
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tax loopholes (GE).‖19 For each miscarriage of shareholder management by an Enron or 
Worldcom, there are multiple cases of legal, sincere attempts by corporations to generate 
returns for shareholders despite the costs to other stakeholders.  
 For example, firms frequently move jobs overseas to improve margins. U.S.-
based multinational companies reduced their American labor force by 2.9 million in the 
past decade while increasing overseas employment by 2.4 million.
20
 As early as 2004, 80 
percent of American firms had discussed outsourcing labor.
21
 When profits conflicted 
with the interests of existing employees, profits won out.  
 The same logic applied to the environment. According to the UN Principles for 
Responsible Investment Initiative, the world‘s 3,000 biggest corporations cause 
approximately $2.2 trillion in annual damage to the environment. Between six and seven 
percent of these companies‘ profits would have been lost if they adopted more 
environmentally-friendly business practices.
22
 Yet the profits were not lost. The 
corporations chose to protect their margins and chose to pollute – a clear prioritization of 
shareholder interests over the public interest in environmental health.  
2.1.1.2 Shareholder Theory as Managerial Justification 
 Whether managers actually try to prioritize shareholder interests remains unclear. 
Most academics feel they do. Academics label shareholder theory ―the driving force of 
                                                        
19
 Stout, Lynn. "'Maximizing Shareholder Value' Is Ill-conceived Concept." Los Angeles Times. September 
02, 2012. Accessed April 01, 2013. http://articles.latimes.com/2012/sep/02/opinion/la-oe-stout-stock-
prices-20120902. 
20
 Lach, Alex. "5 Facts About Overseas Outsourcing." Center for American Progress. July 9, 2012. 
Accessed April 28, 2013. http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/labor/news/2012/07/09/11898/5-facts-
about-overseas-outsourcing/. 
21
 Gongloff, Mark. "U.S. Jobs Jumping Ship." CNNMoney. March 13, 2003. Accessed April 1, 2013. 
http://money.cnn.com/2003/03/13/news/economy/jobs_offshore/. 
22
 Jowit, Juliette. "World's Top Firms Cause $2.2tn of Environmental Damage, Report Estimates." The 
Guardian. February 18, 2010. Accessed April 01, 2013. 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/feb/18/worlds-top-firms-environmental-damage. 
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21
st
 century business‖ and view it as ―entrenched‖ in the Western philosophy of corporate 
governance.
23,24
 A 2007 article in the Journal of Business Ethics found these academics 
might be right: 31 of 34 corporate directors surveyed for the article claimed to have a 
legal duty to maximize shareholder wealth. The directors admitted they would pollute the 
environment, fire employees, and threaten the public interest if it would improve 
profitability (as long as it was legal). 
25
 
 In contrast, most managers claim not to practice shareholder management. Jack 
Welch, the iconic CEO of General Electric, claimed to speak on behalf of most corporate 
executives when he told the Financial Times that shareholder concerns never factor into 
his decision-making.  ―On the face of it,‖ he argued, ―shareholder value is the dumbest 
idea in the world…shareholder value is a result not a strategy…your main constituencies 
[the interests to which managers attend] are your employees, your customers, and your 
products.‖26 While understanding it is likely a firm will benefit from treating stakeholders 
well, managers view stakeholders not as instruments for profit but as constituencies 
inherently deserving of considerate treatment. In fact, only 35 percent of corporations 
even mention maximization of shareholder value in their mission statements. Less than 
half mention shareholder value at all.
27
  
                                                        
23
 Jensen, Keld. "To Hell With Shareholder Value." Forbes. March 18, 2013. Accessed April 01, 2013. 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/keldjensen/2013/03/18/to-hell-with-shareholder-value/. 
24
 Lazonick, William, and Mary O'Sullivan. "Maximizing Shareholder Value: A New Ideology for 
Corporate Governance." Economy and Society 29, no. 1 (2000): 13-35. doi:10.1080/030851400360541. 
25
 Heracleous, Loizos, and Luh Luh Lan. "The Myth of Shareholder Capitalism." Harvard Business 
Review. April 2010. Accessed April 01, 2013. http://hbr.org/2010/04/the-myth-of-shareholder-
capitalism/ar/. 
26
 "Welch Condemns Share Price Focus." Financial Times. Accessed April 01, 2013. 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/294ff1f2-0f27-11de-ba10-0000779fd2ac.html. 
27
 Loderer, Claudio, Lukas Roth, Urs Waelchli, and Petra Joerg. "Shareholder Value: Principles, 
Declarations, and Actions." Financial Management 39, no. 1 (2010): 5-32. doi:10.1111/j.1755-
053X.2009.01064.x. 
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2.1.1.3 Shareholder Theory and the Law 
 The positive shareholder account must also address whether the law requires 
corporations to practice shareholder management. An understanding of ‗what the 
corporation is‘ draws heavily from the way we define corporations in our legal code. 
 According to the American Bar Association, corporate managers have legal 
fiduciary duties to the corporation and to shareholders.
28
 American courts have generally 
held that the duty to the corporation as a whole does not entail a duty to non-
shareholders.
29
 While it remains possible that Friedman overlooks that shareholder 
preferences might require substantial commitments to stakeholders, he is right to argue 
that the law requires managers to act only as agents of the shareholders – not of other 
stakeholders. 
2.1.2 As Normative Theory 
 Normative shareholder theory draws from three primary arguments. The first 
appeals to private property rights, applying them to corporations and their owners. The 
second makes a consequentialist argument that shareholder management yields the best 
outcomes for society. The third argument claims that only shareholder management 
avoids illegal and indefensible taxation of shareholders. 
2.1.2.1 Shareholder Theory and Property Rights 
 A free market requires that individuals have the rights to use their property 
however they please and to reap the rewards of their property‘s use. Alternatively put, a 
well-functioning market only exists when the law protects individuals‘ ability to be both 
                                                        
28
 "Fiduciary Duties and Potential Liabilities of Directors and Officers of Financially Distressed 
Corporations." American Bar. Accessed April 01, 2013. 
http://apps.americanbar.org/buslaw/newsletter/0003/materials/tip3.pdf. 
29
 Ibid 
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controllers and owners of their property. When these conditions are satisfied, the motive 
of profit drives people toward economically efficient outcomes.
30
 Adam Smith promised 
as much in A Wealth of Nations. Self-interested individuals, when they decide how to use 
their property and enjoy the benefits of its usage, will receive guidance from an invisible 
hand toward economic efficiency.  
 In the modern corporation, however, different groups own and control the same 
property. Shareholders own the firm‘s wealth and assets, but managers put them to use. 
Shareholder interest and managerial self-interest might not align, so the invisible hand 
cannot produce efficient outcomes. Friedman thus sees normative appeal in uniting the 
property owners and controllers as best as possible. Legally requiring the manager to use 
the property as the shareholder would – generally to maximize profit – equates the self-
interest of the controller with that of the owner. They become one again, as they were in 
Adam Smith‘s vision of the free market, and the invisible hand returns. Without agency 
costs, perfectly implemented shareholder theory will thus produce economically efficient 
outcomes. To Friedman, the normative appeal of economic efficiency is self-evident.  
2.1.2.2 The Consequentialist Argument 
 Additionally, shareholder theorists argue that shareholder management stimulates 
economic growth. The corporate structure allows individuals and institutions to pool 
resources under singular control. With newfound capital, business ventures gain the 
ability to grow in size, but more importantly, in scale. For instance, the rise of the 
                                                        
30
 Berle, Adolf A., and Gardiner C. Means. The Modern Corporation and Private Property. New York: 
Macmillan, 1933. 
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corporate structure in the 19
th
 century coincided with a period of decreasing production 
costs and increasing profitability in the United States.
31
 
 When managers maximize this profitability, they can return excess profits to 
shareholders as dividends or reinvest them to appreciate their stock price. In either case, 
the shareholder enjoys a high return. A virtuous cycle begins. Cheaper goods make 
consumption more affordable for individuals, who find themselves holding more 
investable funds and wanting access to the corporations‘ massive profits through 
investment.
32
 Corporations receive capital influxes, scale up even further, and produce 
goods even more cheaply. As Robert Reich put it, large corporations shift power ―to 
consumers and investors…[who enjoy] better and cheaper products, and higher 
returns.‖33  
 The shareholder theorists assert that only shareholder management will offer 
sufficient incentive for investors to capitalize corporations. If firms spend capital for 
purely social purposes, as many firms do today with corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
projects, investors‘ expected returns drop. They respond by investing less, firms 
accumulate less capital, production becomes more expensive, and so do goods. When 
firms do not maximize profit, society sees two fundamental tenets of economic growth 
contract: consumption (as a result of higher prices) and investment (as a result of lower 
expected returns).   
                                                        
31
 Ibid 
32
 Ibid 
33
 Reich, Robert B. Supercapitalism: The Transformation of Business, Democracy, and Everyday Life. New 
York: Vintage Books, 2007. 
12 
 
2.1.2.3 Only Shareholder Managers Can Avoid Illegal Taxation 
 When a manager spends corporate profits in a way that reduces returns to 
shareholders, he is spending shareholder money. Friedman finds this analogous to the 
manager ―imposing taxes, on the one hand, and deciding how the tax proceeds are spent, 
on the other.‖34 Such a privately-instituted tax is, to Friedman, indefensible. We establish 
electoral and judicial institutions for the very purpose of regulating the practice of 
taxation; managerial taxation of investors lacks the protections of these institutions. For 
instance, our government‘s checks and balances separate the functions of levying taxes 
and deciding how to spend them, while stakeholder management combines them. The 
stakeholder manager taxes his investors and decides for which cause the tax dollars will 
be spent. As Friedman concludes, ―if they are to impose taxes and make expenditures to 
foster ‗social objectives,‘ then political machinery must be set up to make the assessment 
of taxes and to determine through a political process the objectives to be served.‖35 Since 
corporations do not have this political machinery, stakeholder theory should be avoided. 
Only by maximizing shareholder value for investors will the corporation avoid spending 
shareholder money and avoid the unjust taxation pitfall. Friedman believes this gives 
shareholder theory enormous normative appeal. 
2.2 Stakeholder Theory 
 The stakeholders of a firm are individuals or groups that have an interest in the 
success or failure of that firm. In this paper, I use Edward Freeman‘s narrow group of 
stakeholders, which includes the firm‘s shareholders, suppliers, employees, customers, 
                                                        
34
 Friedman, Milton. "The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits." The New York 
Times Magazine (New York), September 13, 1970. 
35
 Ibid  
13 
 
management, and its local community, because he finds the narrow account more 
persuasive.
36
  
 Each stakeholder might have a different stake in the company, but all have the 
ability to impact other stakeholders through their stakes. For instance, take the 
shareholders, employees, and customers of Toyota Corporation. Shareholders have a 
financial stake, expecting a positive return on their investment in Toyota stock or bonds; 
employees have a compensatory stake, expecting a livelihood and meaningful 
employment in exchange for their time, work, and loyalty. Customers have yet another 
stake, expecting a well-functioning automobile in exchange for their business. 
Regardless, a failure by any stakeholder to fulfill its role in Toyota‘s operations 
significantly harms the firm. Without investment from shareholders, the firm lacks the 
capital to buy production sites or build machinery. Without employees, the firm lacks the 
ability to put its land or machinery to use. Without customers, the firm lacks the cash 
flow to satisfy investors and pay employees.  
 Given the ability for each class of stakeholders to destroy a firm, stakeholder 
theorists believe the role of the firm manager is to balance the interests of each of these 
classes – equally. Stakeholder theorists do not ―give primacy to one stakeholder group 
over another…because when relationships [among stakeholders] become unbalanced, the 
survival of the whole firm is in jeopardy.‖37 
                                                        
36
 Evan, William, and R. Edward Freeman. ―A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation: Kantian 
Capitalism.‖ In An Introduction to Business Ethics. Chryssides, George D., and John H. Kaler. (Cengage 
Learning EMEA, 1993), 254-266. 
37
 Evan, William, and R. Edward Freeman. ―A Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation: Kantian 
Capitalism.‖ In An Introduction to Business Ethics. Chryssides, George D., and John H. Kaler. (Cengage 
Learning EMEA, 1993), 254-266. 
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2.2.1 As Positive Theory 
 For stakeholder theory to enjoy positive persuasiveness, managers today must 
demonstrate a concern for stakeholder interests that exceeds the obligations of law and 
ethical custom. This would manifest itself in corporations not only sacrificing profits in 
the name of other stakeholder interests, but doing so out of genuine consideration for the 
welfare of their stakeholders.
38
 The stakeholder manager cannot prioritize shareholder 
returns, so he cannot care for stakeholder relationships in the name of long run profit 
maximization or a sort of reluctant adherence to laws or social norms. Instead, as 
Friedman himself observed, the stakeholder corporation‘s actions must stem from a 
serious sense of responsibility for stakeholder well being.
39
 
2.2.1.1 The Actions Corporations Take 
 The 21
st
 century has seen a rise in CSR projects. By definition, CSR defies profits 
in the name of other interests. Whether a CEO increases costs to preserve the 
environment or decreases prices to benefit the consumer, his or her action primarily aims 
to benefit non-shareholder groups. When a CEO contracts with a more expensive, 
environmentally-friendly supplier, he or she is said to be practicing CSR; when a CEO 
offers employees free day care programs, he or she also is said to be practicing CSR. The 
overlap between CSR and stakeholder theory is obvious, but the Harvard Kennedy 
School makes a point to mention how CSR exists because companies feel ―accountable 
not only to shareholders but also to stakeholders such as employees, consumers, 
                                                        
38
 Smith, Jeff H. "MIT Sloan Management Review." MIT Sloan Management Review RSS. July 15, 2013. 
Accessed April 01, 2013. http://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/the-shareholders-vs-stakeholders-debate/. 
39
 Friedman, Milton. "The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits." The New York 
Times Magazine (New York), September 13, 1970. 
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suppliers, local communities, policymakers, and society-at-large.‖40 Consequently, 
stakeholder theory would hold positive appeal if it were the case that corporations widely 
adopt CSR and do so because of genuine (non-economic) concern for the welfare of all 
stakeholders. 
  KPMG found that 95 percent of the world‘s 250 largest companies claim to 
practice CSR. Interestingly, the same study found that a company is more likely to 
implement CSR if it is incorporated.
41
 The report concluded that from its philosophical 
beginnings with Freeman to its large-scale support today, stakeholder-oriented projects 
have grown from ―an optional but nice activity… to [having] become virtually 
mandatory.‖42 Clearly, corporations appear willing to sacrifice short-term profits in order 
to protect other stakeholder interests through their CSR. If the corporations‘ justification 
for the CSR invokes stakeholder philosophy, then stakeholder theory might prove to be 
quite persuasive as a positive theory of the corporation. 
2.2.1.2 Stakeholder Theory as Managerial Justification 
 Managers do seem to cite stakeholder philosophy as the justification for their CSR 
and other stakeholder-oriented projects. Their concern for stakeholder welfare appears 
less rooted in a sense of obligation to law and ethical custom – and especially not a 
strategy for long run profit maximization – than in a deep philosophical commitment to 
the welfare of their stakeholders. While Friedman‘s shareholder theory does not preclude 
consideration of stakeholder interests, the data implies that managers feel a much more 
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robust obligation to stakeholders than a reasonably interpreted shareholder theory can 
justify.   
 Thomas Donaldson of the Academy of Management find empirical evidence that 
corporate executives conceive of stakeholder relationships in a way that accords with 
stakeholder theory. Studies by Baumhart (1968), Brenner & Molander (1977), and Posner 
& Schmidt (1984) found that a majority of corporate managers believe it unethical – not 
just uneconomical – to prioritize the interests of shareholders. Baumhart‘s study in 
particular highlighted the popularity of stakeholder management: he estimated that 80 
percent of managers favored the stakeholder approach. Clarkson (1991), Halal (1990), 
and Bartkus & Glassman (2007) all confirmed ―significant‖ ethical concern for 
stakeholder interests among United States corporations.
43
  
 Additionally, close to 60 percent of firms cite ―ethical considerations‖ as their 
reason for adopting CSR – compared with only 32 percent that mention ―shareholder 
value.‖44 Jorg, Loderer, and Roth (2004) conducted a similar study and found similar 
results. They interviewed managers from 313 Swiss firms, finding that 81 percent of 
firms wanted to maximize stakeholder value and more than half wanted to maximize 
shareholder value only ―as long as it did not come at the expense of other stakeholders in 
the firm.‖45  
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2.2.1.3 Stakeholder Theory and the Law 
 Currently, the law does not impose on managers a fiduciary duty to non-
shareholders. The law discusses stakeholder rights in terms of permission rather than 
obligation. More than half of American states have passed statutes that have become 
known as ‗permissible concern‘ laws. These explicitly permit a corporation‘s board of 
directors to consider, in outlining corporate strategies and goals, the interests of ―a host of 
non-shareowner constituencies, including employees, creditors, suppliers, and local 
communities.‖46 Connecticut even requires this consideration.47 This means that 
corporate directors, though rarely required to care for stakeholder interests, would not get 
punished for doing so. Under the doctrine of permissible concern, stakeholder 
management is thus allowed – but not required – under the law.  
 Perhaps because corporations legally do not have to consider stakeholder 
interests, the law limits the degree to which corporations can ignore stakeholders in 
decision-making. Managers have legal duties to honor contractual obligations and 
relevant statutes (like anti-pollution laws); they cannot always use the lack of a fiduciary 
duty as a legal justification for stakeholder exploitation.
48
 For example, congressional 
legislation such as the Clean Air Act and the National Labor Relations Act force 
managers to respect the interests of local populations and employees up to legally-defined 
levels.
49
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2.2.2 As Normative Theory 
 Given the relatively weak presence of stakeholder philosophy in American law, 
stakeholder theorists justify their account mostly in the realm of morality. They believe 
only stakeholder management is morally-defensible and that the corporation should be 
structured in accordance with stakeholder philosophy. At the core of their normative 
account lie three appeals: to Kantian ethics (stakeholders must not be treated as a mere 
means), to individual responsibility (corporations are responsible for their effects on 
others), and to consequentialism (corporations adhering to stakeholder philosophy 
produce the best outcomes in society).
50
   
2.2.2.1 Kant and the ‘Mere Means’ Defense 
 Freeman invokes Kant in claiming that stakeholders must not be treated as a mere 
means. He argues that each stakeholder in a corporation becomes a stakeholder through 
voluntary exchanges from which the stakeholder hopes to become better off. When one 
stakeholder harms another stakeholder in the name of self-interest – without including the 
latter in the decision-making process – the first uses the second as a mere means, which is 
morally-indefensible. For example, managers treat employees as a mere means to profit 
when they arbitrarily decide to lower employee wages. The decision, which affects 
employee welfare, did not include the employees‘ participation, and Freeman (and he 
claims Kant) would find this unjust.  
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2.2.2.2 Corporations Must Be Responsible for Their Actions  
 The responsibility justification centers on the idea that corporations should take 
responsibility for their actions. Modern corporations have grown so large and influential 
in society that they now have an ethical duty to care for those under their control and 
influence. By definition, the stakeholders are those subjected to corporate control and 
influence, so the responsibility argument reaches the conclusion that corporations have a 
duty to care for stakeholder welfare. As Adolf Berle described it, there is ―an insistence 
that power in economic organization shall be subjected to the same tests of public benefit 
which have been applied…to…power otherwise located [i.e. government].‖ The test, for 
Berle and other stakeholder theorists, is ―the well-being of those who are subject to the 
organization, whether workers, investors, or consumers.‖51 Alternatively put, in order to 
hold corporations responsible for their actions – a notion Berle would argue has intrinsic 
normative appeal – society must require stakeholder management.  
2.2.2.3 Stakeholder Theory Produces Better Outcomes for Society  
 The consequentialist argues simply that society is best off when corporations 
practice stakeholder management. Typically, stakeholder theory is defended by ―the 
utilitarian stream of consequentialism.‖52 Either the best corporate action is the one that 
maximizes the total utility of all stakeholders, or the one that maximizes the number of 
stakeholders that receive utility from the action. The consequentialists believe the 
stakeholder manager will deliver the best outcome in both cases, so they submit 
stakeholder theory offers the best normative account of the corporation.
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3. An Analysis of The Fiduciary Theories 
 I will begin the chapter by presenting the objections to shareholder theory, then 
move to objections to stakeholder theory. I will conclude by considering arguments that 
critique fiduciary theories in general.  
3.1 Objections to Shareholder Theory  
3.1.1 Friedman Misunderstands Ethical Custom 
 Shareholder theory does not call for unconstrained profit maximization. The 
Friedman caveat prioritizes law and ethical custom, articulating that managers should 
maximize profits only after they honor their legal and ethical commitments.  
 When I presented the shareholder account, I admitted to making an assumption 
about the scope of ethical custom. I argued that Friedman‘s theory, properly understood, 
tied managers only to minimal ethical commitments, but Ken Goodpaster sees a 
difference between Friedman‘s account, properly understood, and our society‘s actual 
ethical custom, properly understood. In other words, Goodpaster disagrees with Friedman 
that our ethical custom imposes only minimal obligations on the corporate manager. And 
when Friedman is forced to account for the full scope of our ethical custom, Goodpaster 
says, shareholder theory fails to distinguish itself from stakeholder theory in any 
meaningful way.  
 Goodpaster asserts that our ethical custom involves obligations to everyone 
affected by our actions. Whenever we pursue self-interested goals, we must still respect 
fundamental moral obligations to society during our pursuit – that our project is self-
interested does not relieve us of publicly interested duties. Our ethical custom in a sense 
demands personal stakeholder management, since we must consider during our decision-
21 
 
making process how our actions will impact the interests of others. Goodpaster then 
posits a Nemo Dat Principle (NDP) that ―no one can expect of an agent behavior that is 
ethically less responsible than what he would expect of himself.‖53 The NDP, applied to 
corporations, holds corporate managers to the same ethical standard of their shareholders. 
 Taken together, ethical custom and the NDP require corporations to honor moral 
obligations to stakeholders. Individuals must consider stakeholder interests when 
deciding upon individual actions, corporations must abide by the same ethical standard as 
individuals, and so corporations must consider stakeholders when deciding upon 
corporate actions. Even though non-fiduciary in nature, these stakeholder obligations 
remain, in Goodpaster‘s eyes, ―equally important.‖54 Goodpaster thus concludes that our 
ethical custom – to which Friedman tethers corporate managers – forces shareholder 
theory to converge with stakeholder theory. Corporations have equally important moral 
obligations to consider the interests of non-shareholders in their decision-making process, 
because our ethical custom requires them to do so. 
3.1.2 Does the Legal Fiduciary Duty to Shareholders Obligate Shareholder 
Management?  
 Even stakeholder theorists recognize that managers have a fiduciary duty to 
shareholders that they do not have to other stakeholders. They understand this is simply 
―a legal reality.‖55 But shareholder theorists and stakeholder theorists clash over the 
significance of the fiduciary duty. 
                                                        
53
 Goodpaster, Kenneth E. ―Business Ethics and Stakeholder Analysis.‖ Business Ethics Quarterly, Vol. 1, 
No. 1 (Jan., 1991): 53-73. Accessed April 17, 2013. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2857592. 
54
 Ibid 
55
 Ibid 
22 
 
 Stakeholder theorists argue that the spirit of the fiduciary duty is to protect 
shareholders from managerial greed: it is not to assert a primacy for shareholders in the 
hierarchy of corporate decision-making. In the absence of managerial self-dealing or 
corruption as issues, they claim, the law does not ask managers to prioritize shareholder 
interests.
56
  
 The law itself defines the fiduciary duty to shareholders as involving duties of 
care and loyalty. The duty of care is an obligation to govern prudently: a promise to 
manage the corporation with a good faith attempt to pursue the best interests of the 
corporation as a whole. The duty of loyalty prohibits managers from engaging in 
improper self-enrichment and self-dealing. The legal text, in both cases, makes no 
mention of the relationship between shareholders interests and those of other 
stakeholders. On the other hand, both duties refer to a manager‘s obligation to earnestly 
pursue corporate interests, which suggests the stakeholder theorists are correct about the 
spirit of the fiduciary duty.  
 The fundamental question is thus whether a public interest, such as the welfare of 
non-shareholders, can be plausibly understood as an interest of the corporation. Managers 
have a legal duty to further the interest of the corporation, and if the corporation has an 
interest in caring for the interests of its stakeholders, (that is separate from the interest in 
long run profit accumulation) then the law would seem to require stakeholder 
management. However, whether the corporation has a legitimate interest in safeguarding 
the welfare of its stakeholders is a normative question, answerable only by moral 
philosophy. The significance of this objection is that current law does not preclude 
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stakeholder management if one can persuasively defend stakeholder management as a 
legitimate interest of the corporation. 
3.1.3 Do Shareholders Have Interests Other than Profit Maximization? 
 Friedman says that managers are the agents of shareholders, responsible for 
furthering shareholder interests. Then he quickly concludes that shareholder interests, in 
most cases, are simply to maximize returns under the constraints of law and ethical 
custom. In emphasizing the centrality of profit in investor decision-making, Friedman 
takes what Elizabeth Anderson calls a homo economicus view of human beings; we are 
rational, self-interested pursuers of utility maximization. But as Anderson points out, 
homo economicus approaches ―ignore the actual causes of human behavior.‖57  
 Investment data suggests that investors frequently prioritize social concerns over 
returns. The term socially-responsible investing (SRI) was coined to refer to investors‘ 
desire to ―promote concepts and ideals that they feel strongly about [through their 
investments].‖58 SRI has grown more than 22 percent since 2010 and now roughly one 
out of every nine invested dollars in the United States can be classified as SRI.
59
 
Investors, from retail to institutional, commit to SRI even though it has ―has been 
generally disappointing in the returns department.‖60  
 It would thus appear that Friedman overly discounts investors‘ attention to 
business ethics. Many investors hold businesses to a much higher standard than mere 
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conformity to the basic rules of society. Friedman might be correct that the law requires 
corporations to further only shareholder interests, but the advancement of shareholder 
interests in turn demands far greater consideration for stakeholder interests than 
Friedman‘s account, if it is to be meaningfully different from the stakeholder account, 
can justify. 
3.2 Objections to Stakeholder Theory 
3.2.1 Who Counts as a Stakeholder? 
 Freeman himself recognizes there are two definitions of ―stakeholder.‖ The 
narrow definition refers to groups ―vital‖ to the success and survival of the corporation; 
the wide definition includes any group or individual who can affect or be affected by the 
corporation.
61
 Freeman proclaims his easiest step is to defend the narrow account, but I 
find even that problematic. Groups beyond Freeman‘s employees, suppliers, etc. satisfy 
his narrow definition of a stakeholder. The actions of competitors, for instance, prove 
―vital‖ to the success of a corporation indeed. If a competitor decides to sell its product 
for $10 instead of $10,000, it will profoundly alter the success of a corporation. And yet 
Freeman precludes competitors from stakeholdership. He argues that companies can exist 
in monopoly settings – without competitors – where the tenets of stakeholder theory still 
apply. According to Freeman, monopolies still do and should consider the interests of 
other stakeholders in their decision-making. In other words, he seems to say that 
competitors do not count as stakeholders because they do not always exist.
62
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 This is incredibly odd reasoning. Corporations can also exist without other 
stakeholders that Freeman does include in his account. A corporation does not need 
suppliers; it can produce self-sufficiently. A corporation does not need a local 
community; it can operate in unpopulated and remote areas. Freeman would probably 
have to concede this point and admit that one must only care for suppliers and local 
communities when they exist. This, however, would defeat Freeman‘s original 
justification for precluding competitors. If local communities do not always exist, but 
must factor into the stakeholder manager‘s decision-making when they do, it follows that 
the stakeholder manager can function in a monopoly setting but still must consider the 
interests of competitors when competitors exist.  
 The moment Freeman includes competitors and other ―wide-definition‖ 
stakeholders into his narrow account, his theory begins to lose both positive and 
normative persuasiveness. Are corporations today actually factoring in the interests of 
competitors when making decisions? Probably not, and there is a strong possibility that 
corporations actually attempt to harm competitors. Should corporations be considering 
the interests of competitors in their decision-making? Almost definitely not. Especially 
when we consider other elements of Freeman‘s stakeholder theory – like how the 
corporate manager must weigh stakeholder interests equally – it seems even more wrong 
to require corporations to give the same considerations to the interests of their investors 
and of their competitors.  
3.2.2 Do We Always Treat Others as Mere Means in Business Relationships? 
 Freeman heavily relies on Kantian ethics to justify managerial obligations to other 
stakeholders. He finds that ―stakeholders have some inalienable rights to participate in 
26 
 
decisions that substantially affect their welfare or involve their being used as a means to 
another‘s ends.‖63 Managers who ignore the interests of legitimate stakeholders use these 
stakeholders as mere means to corporate profits, meaning managers have an ethical 
obligation to practice stakeholder theory.  
 However, Freeman appears to ignore Kant‘s distinction between means and mere 
means. To treat someone as a means to your benefit is allowable and morally-defensible; 
Kant would allow me to work my employee to the bone in the name of corporate profit as 
long the employee legitimately consents to the treatment. To treat someone as a mere 
means is not morally-defensible, and consent is not enough to disqualify a relationship 
from being a mere means relationship. When we force others into action, either by lying 
or coercion, they do not truly consent, and the consent of a mentally ill person similarly 
cannot be understood as legitimate consent.
64
 For instance, I cannot get an employee to 
sign a contract by promising two years of employment and then fire him the next week to 
cut costs. I solicited his consent by lying, which would undermine the legitimacy of the 
consent. But Freeman‘s point is even larger. He seems to say that every means 
relationship, even those with legitimate consent from both parties, is a mere means 
relationship. I can never fire any employee without including that employee in the 
decision-making process, or else I treat the employee as a mere means. I disagree. 
 Elizabeth Anderson points out how business relationships, by definition, are use 
relationships. I contract with a supplier not to give the supplier a livelihood, but because I 
need supplies to produce my goods and ultimately to earn profit. I use my supplier as a 
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means to profit, my employees as a means to profit, and all other stakeholders as a means 
to profit. And they use my corporation as a means too. My employees view my 
corporation as a means to a livelihood, my suppliers view my corporation as a means to 
revenue, and my customers view my corporation as a means to goods and services. As 
long as stakeholder relationships stem from legitimate consent, and Freeman‘s 
description of ‗voluntary, mutually-beneficial exchanges‘ suggests they do, then it would 
appear that use relationships do not violate Kantian ethics and so his justification for 
stakeholder management fails. There is an important difference between means and mere 
means that Freeman overlooks.  
3.2.3 What Use is Stakeholder Theory in Practice? 
 Goodpaster claims that stakeholder theory cannot guide corporate decision-
making. It might outline who will be affected by a decision and to what extent, but it does 
not provide a platform from which a manager can reach a decision. In Goodpaster‘s 
words, ―to be told that stakeholders are or must be ‗taken into account‘ is…to be told 
very little.‖65  
 Freeman tries to alleviate Goodpaster‘s concern with two principles of 
stakeholder management. First, corporations must be managed for the benefit of their 
stakeholders, who in turn deserve a role in a firm‘s decision-making when decisions 
affect their stakes. Second, managers must enter into a fiduciary relationship with the 
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corporation as an abstract entity, which also means a fiduciary duty to the long-term 
interests of each class of stakeholders.
66
  
 Goodpaster would likely remain unsatisfied. He would ask what it means to have 
a role in a firm‘s decision-making process, hoping that Freeman would recognize the 
infeasibility of requiring firms to call a stakeholder‘s representative each time a decision 
affected that stakeholder. Goodpaster would want a practical account of how managers 
can satisfy their ethical responsibility to include stakeholders in decision-making. 
 Similarly, Goodpaster would ask Freeman to crystallize his second principle so a 
manager would know how to honor his fiduciary duty to the corporation as an abstract 
entity. Would the manager need to maximize total utility, after the utilities of all 
stakeholders are considered? Or would the best decision maximize the number of 
stakeholders receiving utility? Freeman does not answer these questions, even in a later 
paper of his that claimed to outline four levels of ―stakeholder responsibility in practice.‖ 
Goodpaster would find this alarming considered managers are expected to apply 
stakeholder theory and practice stakeholder management.
67
 
3.3 Objections to Both Fiduciary Theories 
 Fiduciary theories of the corporation hinge on agency. The corporate manager 
must make decisions on behalf of another group and attempt to further the interests of his 
principals when making decisions. If managers defy their agential responsibilities – if 
they neglect the interests of their principals – fiduciary theories of the corporation lose 
substantial appeal, both as positive and normative accounts. In other words, if we cannot 
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trust managers to respect their agential responsibilities, or hold them accountable when 
they self-deal, it is not clear why we should structure corporations around a concept of 
agency.  
3.3.1 Do Managers Neglect the Interests of their Principals? 
 Critics of fiduciary corporate theories do not expect managers to prioritize the 
interests of principals over self-interest. Adam Smith recognized two hundred years ago 
that ―the directors of such [corporations]…being the managers rather of other people‘s 
money than of their own, it cannot well be expected, that they should watch over it with 
the same anxious vigilance…Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always prevail, 
more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company.‖68 Managers do not 
own the property they control and Smith predicted that both the stakeholder and 
shareholder managers would attend first to their own self-interest. Overwhelming 
evidence of managerial greed supports his view.  
 Managers frequently further their private interests at the expense of shareholder 
and stakeholder welfare. For instance, the compensation of chief executive officers 
(CEOs) is 20 to 40 percent higher when the CEO has a voice in determining his or her 
own compensation.
69
 The result is managerial compensation that almost never reflects 
levels that accord with shareholder or stakeholder interests. When investors have 
expanded power to change executive compensation (such as when members of the 
executive compensation committee own equity in the corporation), they almost always 
                                                        
68
 Smith, Adam. The Wealth of Nations. London: Penguin Books, 1999. 
69
 Cyert, Richard M., Sok-Hyon Kang and Praveen Kumar. ―Corporate Governace, Takeovers, and Top-
Management Compensation: Theory and Evidence.‖ Management Science Vol. 48, No.4 (Apr. 2002): 453-
469. Accessed April 18, 2013. http://fisher.osu.edu/~young_53/Cyert-Kang-Kumar.pdf. 
30 
 
respond by lowering executive pay.
70
 Even the corporate executives‘ use of private jets 
plummets when control of the firm moves from public shareholders to private equity 
companies, who have more incentive to ensure corporate compensation aligns with the 
best interest of shareholders.
71
  
 The managerial greed is not limited to compensation: managers frequently 
prioritize their personal control of the firm as well. The best examples come from 
takeover attempts. Managers typically resist takeovers even if acquirers offer 
shareholders a premium for their ownership stakes.
72
 On the other hand, when managers 
possess ‗golden parachute‘ provisions in their contracts – large and guaranteed payouts in 
the event of takeovers – their resistance drops noticeably.73 A study by Duke University 
even showed that managers accept takeovers more frequently as they approach retirement 
age, and no longer care as much whether they lose their job or power.
74
  The implication 
is thus clear. Managers frequently prioritize self-interest, whether in the form of personal 
compensation or power preservation, regardless of the cost to shareholders and other 
stakeholders.  
3.3.2 Is Correction of Agency Problems Impossible in Public Corporations? 
 Most publicly traded corporations lack a real ability to correct agency problems. 
In theory, boards of directors oversee the performance of corporate managers; the board 
retains the power both to select executive officers and to change their pay. Board 
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governance certainly offers advantages to the corporation, namely in the form of 
centralized decision-making, but the board can rarely deliver meaningful  oversight of 
managerial behavior because the managers themselves frequently comprise the board.  
 In 2012, more than half of S&P 500 corporations had the chief executive officer 
also chair the board of directors. The person overseen and leading the overseeing were 
thus one and the same for almost 60 percent of corporations.
75
 Legally, shareholders can 
oust directors with a simple majority vote. However, the manager-directors can make it 
very difficult for common shareholders to accumulate the necessary votes. Board 
directors have the power to: (1) use corporate funds to finance re-election campaigns; (2) 
stagger elections so no single election turns over control to a new group; and (3) change 
the rules of the elections.
76
  
 Empirical evidence confirms how little power shareholders have over their board 
of directors. From 1996 to 2005, shareholders ousted incumbent board directors a total of 
45 times. For large companies, defined as having a market capitalization of over $200 
million, that figure drops to a mere eight instances over the entire decade. For context, it 
is worth noting that the smallest corporate market capitalization in the S&P 500 is $1.58 
billion. Two-thirds of all challenges to director re-election failed, a number that pales in 
comparison to the number of incumbents that won unopposed.
77
  
 Clearly, managers that sit on their own boards have a diverse toolset they can use 
to protect their board positions. And when managers control the board of directors, the 
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same people are charged with misbehavior and correcting the misbehavior. The 
enforcement of managers‘ agential responsibilities clearly suffers as a consequence
33 
 
4. My Conclusions  
4.1 The Best Positive Theory   
 My aim in this paper is to arrive at the most compelling theory of the modern day 
corporation. From a positive perspective, this requires an understanding of what the 
corporation is and how it is structured. It seems to me that Friedman‘s shareholder theory 
provides a very compelling account. While his primary issue is that he does not articulate 
his notion of ‗ethical custom,‘ the spirit of Friedman‘s argument suggests that he views 
the corporation as a profit-maximizer that reluctantly honors imposed legal 
responsibilities and a minimal, basic set of ethical norms. The way we structure 
corporations in the law and the way corporations behave both accord very well with this 
understanding of Friedman‘s theory.  
 The law says that corporations assume a fiduciary duty to shareholders and no 
other stakeholders. While the fiduciary duty does not necessarily require corporations to 
prioritize shareholder interests – stakeholder theorists are quick to point out how the legal 
duty seeks only to prohibit managerial self-dealing – the existence of only one fiduciary 
duty clarifies that managers do not have the same legal commitments to stakeholders that 
they do to shareholders. The law therefore demands corporations act in one of two ways. 
Either they act in the manner Friedman‘s account calls for, caring only for shareholder 
interests in the context of other laws, or they honor some minimal set of legal 
commitments to shareholders and then attend to other stakeholders‘ interests.78  
 Corporate actions indicate that most managers adopt the profit maximization 
interpretation. From outsourcing to pollution, corporations routinely demonstrate a 
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priority for shareholder returns over stakeholder well being. In many cases, managers 
even go beyond shareholder theory, breaking laws and employing questionable ethics in 
the pursuit of profit.
79
  
 Normative appeal aside, corporations just do not practice stakeholder 
management – even if they think that they do. When GE‘s Jack Welch argued that 
managers do not focus on profits, in the same breath he admitted the opposite. He called 
shareholder value ―a result.‖80 If managers make robust commitments to stakeholders, but 
only because they view stakeholders as instruments toward long run profits, the 
commitment to stakeholders is fully explained (and required) by shareholder theory. As 
Goodpaster notes, when managers view stakeholders as means to profit ―their basic 
outlook subordinates other stakeholder concerns to those of stockholders.‖81 Welch‘s 
argument is not a condemnation of shareholder management but of the ways most 
managers approach shareholder value maximization. He understands that shareholder 
value is the desired result, but implies it is maximized only when corporations 
substantially commit to stakeholder welfare.
82
 Like Friedman, Welch implores managers 
to maximize shareholder value; he just emphasizes, more than Friedman, the importance 
of stakeholder relationships in the process. 
 Welch‘s argument, properly understood, sheds light on why firms adopt practices 
like CSR so frequently. The reason is not stakeholder theory. Rather, corporations know 
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that they need to maintain a positive reputation with consumers and employees in order to 
maximize profits. To most this is an obvious point, but the fact that Nike‘s sales dropped 
$1 billion in 1999 – the year after it was accused of exploiting Asian labor – offers 
empirical proof.
83
  
 As a result, CSR initiatives prove quite consistent with shareholder theory. CSR 
improves firms‘ access to human capital; one study at Stanford University found that 
MBA graduates ―would sacrifice an average of $13,700 in salary to work for a socially 
responsible company‖ and another found that 70 percent of North American students 
would refuse to work at a socially-irresponsible firm. 
84,85
 CSR also protects the 
corporations‘ sales. Consumers expect significant social responsibility from corporations 
today and try to guide corporate behavior with their purchase decisions.
86
 Unsurprisingly, 
brand reputation is the reason corporations most frequently list for practicing CSR.
87
 
 Firms clearly prioritize shareholder returns, even if they view stakeholder 
relationships as more important for profit maximization than Friedman would have 
predicted. My interpretation of Friedman‘s theory can thus be said to provide a very 
persuasive positive theory of the corporation. They seek to maximize returns for 
shareholders, while honoring (usually) other legal and basic ethical obligations – and are 
encouraged by our legal code to do so. 
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4.2 The Best Normative Theory 
 The corporation is a legal construct. It is only as powerful as the laws that a 
government uses to define it. As a result, I argue that governments should structure these 
corporations so that the effects of corporate activity will further legitimate functions of 
the government. 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to articulate a comprehensive account of the 
legitimate aims of a state or to compare the relative merits of different aims. Instead, I 
take a legitimate aim of the state that I believe the corporate entity can be understood to 
advance – that of promoting the general welfare of citizens – and develop a corporate 
structure that best furthers this aim.
88
 The fact that my structure furthers a legitimate 
government aim, I argue, gives my account substantial normative appeal. I therefore 
define the most compelling normative theory of the corporation as the one that best 
furthers the state‘s ability to maximize the welfare of its citizens. 
 The corporation reduces transaction costs in business and lowers per-unit fixed 
costs. If we structure a corporation in a way that allows individuals to pool resources 
under singular control, then the existence of the corporate entity drives down costs of 
production. More people can consume, businesses earn more profits, and more people get 
hired. As Friedman put it, the incentive for creating corporations is ―the increased 
product made possible.‖89 Ignoring (for now) the other societal effects that corporations 
might have, we can say the corporate structure that best promotes the general welfare is 
the one that maximizes the corporation‘s ability to stimulate economic activity through 
decreased production costs. 
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 Corporations decrease costs by increasing scale. Fixed costs spread over more 
individual units and transaction costs drop when more resources come under centralized 
control.
90
 The two types of resources at the firm‘s disposal are human and financial 
capital, so governments have an interest in defining the corporation in a way that 
facilitates the accumulation of each type of capital.  
 I will start with financial capital. While debt financing remains important, the 
unique function of the corporate entity is that it can increase businesses‘ access to equity 
capital, or as Berle calls it, ―the wealth of innumerable individuals.‖91 On my view, the 
more a theory of the corporation incentivizes individuals to provide capital, the more 
persuasive it becomes. This requires knowledge of the factors that drive stockholders to 
invest. According to Milton Friedman, the factor in most cases is profit alone.
92
 We 
invest because we expect a return on our investment and we invest more when we expect 
a higher return. By providing ownership of profits (stockholdership), limiting risk 
(reducing liability) and encouraging managers to maximize profits (total shareholder 
value, not just short term earnings), we can be plausibly understood to have maximized 
the incentives for investors to provide financial capital to corporations. While investors, 
through SRI, might reward the most socially-responsible companies and punish the least, 
it is important to recall that just under 90 percent of investment dollars go not toward SRI 
but to investments promising the highest expected returns.
93
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 Meanwhile, firms also need access to human capital so they can put the financial 
capital to use. Interestingly, employees make decisions whether to work and how much to 
work very similarly to how investors make investment decisions. Both seem to care first 
for their compensation – either wages, salary, or returns – before attending to their ethical 
concerns. For instance, employee motivation is most strongly correlated with 
compensation, but high-paid employees are willing to sacrifice some compensation for 
the chance to work at socially-responsible companies.
94,95
  
 Since general welfare depends on decreased production costs, which in turn 
results from human and financial capital accumulation, it would thus appear that the best 
theory of the corporation would impose a dual-fiduciary duty on corporate managers: to 
the interests of investors and of shareholders. Given the aforementioned preferences of 
investors and employees, this dual-agent manager will look much like Friedman‘s 
corporate manager. He will pursue profits while conforming to law and very basic ethical 
norms (if we make the reasonable assumption here that employees and investors would 
not knowingly support illegal activity or grossly unethical behavior).  
 However, this account so far ignores that other factors contribute to general 
welfare. Poor environmental health, for instance, would detract from general welfare 
because citizens might not be able to drink or breathe without assuming enormous health 
risks. To truly enjoy normative appeal, the corporation must recognize when other claims 
                                                        
94
 Rynes, Sara L., Barry Gerhart, and Kathleen A. Minette. ―The Importance of Pay in Employee 
Motivation: Discrepancies Between What People Say and What They Do.‖ Tippie College of Business. 
Accessed April 27, 2013. 
http://www.utm.edu/staff/mikem/documents/Payasamotivator.pdf. 
95
 Fox, Adrienne. ―HR Magazine: Corporate Social Responsibility Pays Off.‖ Society For Human Resource 
Management. Vol. 52, No. 8. August 2, 2007. Accessed April 20, 2013. 
39 
 
on the general welfare, and even when claims of other legitimate aims of the state, 
outweigh the public interest in cheaper production of goods. 
 We can have the corporation handle competing public interests in one of two 
ways. We could entrust the corporations to determine when other public interests 
outweigh the public interest provided by having corporations, but the more appealing 
solution is to let the public itself make this determination. Through elected officials, with 
the guidance of established political institutions and the oversight of a judiciary system, 
we can set limits on corporate behavior. In other words, the solution to the problem of 
competing public interests comes from legislation.  
 But then the question arises whether we can trust the policymaking process. Here 
it seems like the answer is no, due to practical and theoretical issues.  
 The theoretical issue is that corporations are going to be incentivized to change 
the laws. If they are told to maximize profits, and they know a different set of laws would 
allow for more profits, they are going to lobby for legislative change.
96
 As the seminal 
Supreme Court case Citizens United v. FEC revealed, corporations will spend millions on 
advertising campaigns for the purpose of electioneering.
97
 This consequence threatens the 
general welfare and also other aims of the state, including the protection of liberty and 
justice. Corporations‘ vast resources would allow corporations to dominate public 
political discourse; their freedom of speech would deny other (real) people the freedom to 
hear diverse political opinions. Furthermore, corporate political expenditures would 
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subject shareholders to coerced speech if the corporations supported candidates that some 
shareholders themselves opposed.
98
  
 The practical issue is that law enforcement lacks the resources to hold 
corporations accountable to the laws we establish. The New York Times study on 
pollution demonstrated this perfectly. As a society, we passed the Clean Water Act. We 
felt that the public interest in clean water outweighed its interest the cheaper consumption 
provided by corporations, as long as pollution reached levels outlawed by the legislation. 
When corporations realized they would not be punished for breaking the law – even 
knowing their actions were against the law – 23,000 of them violated the act. Moreover, 
the 23,000 were simply those in ―significant non-compliance,‖ which was the highest 
level of non-compliance that the law specified. 
 As a result, the profit-maximizing firm, bound only by the law, is not yet morally-
defensible. It threatens the general will, public liberties, and justice by corrupting the 
lawmaking process. I thus call for a ban on corporate expenditures toward electioneering 
efforts. While Friedman might argue that corporate political speech is crucial for 
protecting economic freedoms of association, I firmly believe that the costs of corporate 
electioneering – harms to listener autonomy, to the freedom of shareholder speech, and to 
the general welfare – justify barring these expenditures. But even if barred from changing 
the laws, the corporation will still resist its legal constraints if the benefits from doing so 
outweigh the costs of legal punishment or if law enforcement will not be able to punish 
them at all. Such is the consequence of structuring the corporation as a profit maximizer: 
laws alone will not lead the corporation to defer to other, more important public interests. 
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 Ralph Nader proposed a solution to the practical issue with federal charters. He 
points out that corporate behemoths can significantly harm society when they ignore 
public interests, so he believes federal charters should be required for corporations of a 
certain size (both in terms of annual sales and employees).
99
 The charter would not look 
the same for each corporation, but would enact certain provisions depending on the 
industry and firm. Some of these provisions might include: (1) limits on the amount a 
corporation could invest in other corporations; (2) government stock ownership; (3) 
tiered liability structures that holds management more accountable; and (4) the 
appointment of a public interest-trustee to serve as part of the daily management 
structure.
100
 Even a milder form of his solution – a reserved seat on boards of directors 
for a public official – would seem to offer enormous normative appeal for its likely effect 
of aligning corporate actions with public interests. A report by the United States 
Department of Justice indicated that both the directorship and the chartering system 
would ―offer…a better solution for [corporate] accountability.‖101 
  The public charter solution might sound radical, but the theory behind it is not. It 
would ―require corporations to meet certain public obligations in exchange for privileges 
conferred through incorporation.‖102 This is precisely the solution required by my account 
of the corporation. I held that the most normatively-compelling corporation was the one 
structured to maximize profits but also to defer to superseding public interests. 
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Friedman‘s account does not sufficiently protect public interests, but it appears the public 
charter would.  
 Consequently, my inquiry so far produces a corporation managed for the benefit 
of its shareholders and employees, that would be required to procure federal chartering 
when it reached a certain size, and that would be barred from expending corporate money 
toward electioneering.  
 However, I my theory must be refined. Knowing that my account calls for a dual-
fiduciary duty, and knowing also the agency problems associated with them, I wish to 
adapt my account to control the consequences of managerial self-dealing as best as 
possible. 
 Agency problems are inevitable. While efforts to align managerial self-interest 
with corporate interests do mitigate the issue, corporations cannot reasonably expect 
managers‘ self interest always to be the corporation‘s self-interest.103 Adam Smith and 
Milton Friedman provide compelling theoretical accounts explaining why we should 
always expect self-dealing in corporations.  
 On the other hand, I submit that the problem of accountability can be fixed. 
Managers might be less likely to act on their self-interest if they are likely to be caught 
and to be punished. Given that boards of directors supply the oversight of managerial 
performance, it would seem plausible that banning managers from these boards, or at 
least removing their voting power, would improve accountability. Managers argue that 
they deserve a seat on the board because their insight informs the board‘s decision-
making, but I do not see why a well-functioning board would not find other ways to 
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obtain the information that the manager would contribute.
104
 If nothing else, the board 
could consult with the manager when necessary; this information-contribution argument 
does not seem to justify the manager‘s permanent seat, much less chairmanship, of the 
board of directors. So I propose they do not have it. 
 At last, I arrive at the theory of the corporation that I believe is the most 
normatively-appealing. Derived from the state‘s legitimate interest in maximizing the 
welfare of its citizens, my theory says: 
(1) The corporation should be managed for the benefit of its shareholders and its 
employees; 
(2) The corporation must obtain a federal charter when it reaches a sufficient size, the 
terms of which to be determined by the state so as to best protect the general 
welfare; 
(3) The corporation‘s managers are not permitted to vote on decisions by the board of 
directors and are strongly discouraged from serving on the board at all; 
(4) The corporation may not expend corporate resources toward electioneering 
efforts, defined as efforts to support or oppose candidates and/or legislation. 
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